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AMERICANS WITH DISABillTIES ACT: AN ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF THE ADA SHOULD NOT BE A DEFENSE
IN A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
PROCEEDING
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in
1990 to ensure persons with disabilities "equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency."!
The ADA attempts to stop discrimination against persons with disabilities,2 as well as expand the reach of the Rehabilitation Act of
19733 to the actions of all state and local governments. 4 To accomplish these goals, Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity5 from
excluding an individual's participation in the public entity's services,
programs, or activities based on the person's disability.6 In addition,
Title II prohibits denials of the benefits of a public entity's services,
programs, or activities on the same basis. 7
Many disabled parents face an even more daunting challenge
in their lives besides the possible denial or reduction in their benefits, namely the loss of a child. Now many disabled parents lose the
right to raise their children based solely on their disabilities. As a
result, disabled parents have attempted to cloak themselves in the
ADA's protection as a defense in state termination of parental rights
proceedings. 8 Proponents of this argument justify using the ADA as
a shield for parents because the State is a public entity; therefore,
termination of their parental rights violates the ADA.9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (8) (Supp. II 1991).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV 1992).
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). The ADA defines a public entity as: "(A) any State
or local government; (B) any deparunent, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any other commuter authority
(as defined in section 502(8) of title 45)." Id.
See id. § 12132.
See id.
See infra Part V.
See In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 720 (Vt. 1997) (concluding that the ADA does not
apply to termination of parental rights proceedings because such "proceedings are not 'services, programs, or activities' within the meaning of ... the
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Further, some parents argue that because they are disabled,
states should provide "intensive family preservation services" to help
them keep their children. lo However, these arguments have not
been successfulY For instance, in In re G.M.,12 the court held that
because the mother did not raise any ADA issues at trial she was
precluded from doing so on appeal,13 and even if they were considered on appeal, the mother would lose because Social Services afforded "reasonable accommodations" in the form of services
provided. 14
In addition to unfavorable case law, parents face States that
codified their own procedures for terminating parental rights. States
differ regarding what constitutes termination of parental rights.
Some do not require their agencies to offer any services to the parents before the parental rights can be terminated. 15 Others, including Maryland, require services be provided to the parents in an attempt to reunite the child with the parents before termination
proceedings can begin. 16
Many disabled parents whose parental rights are terminated suffer from mental disorders and deficiencies, narcotics or alcohol dependency, and the likeP In the cases decided since In re G.M., most
courts have held that while a violation of the ADA is not a defense
ill termination proceedings,18 parents can bring a separate action

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

16.

17.

18.

ADA").
In re C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562, 565-66 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (disagreeing with the
mother's arguments that the ADA was violated).
See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
526 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
See id. at 566.
Id.
See Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children and Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824,
830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that "even a complete failure to provide services cannot serve as a basis to attack the termination of parental rights") (citing S.E.S. v. Grant County Dept. of Welfare, 594 N.E.2d 447, 448 (Ind. 1992».
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (c) (2) (i) (1999) (listing one of the required considerations in determining to terminate parental rights as "the
timeliness, nature, and extent of the services offered by the child placement
agency to facilitate reunion of child with the natural parent").
See, e.g., Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 827 (addressing the termination of parental
rights of a mentally deficient mother with an I.Q. of 67, and father with an
I.Q. of 71); Robinson v. Washington, 896 P.2d 1298, 1300-01 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995) (addressing the termination of parental rights where both parents were
mentally impaired, and the father abused drugs).
See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 830 (stating that while the ADA was enacted to protect
persons with disabilities it was not "intended ipso facto to re-write state sub-
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against a public entity for allegedly violating their ADA rights. 19 For
example, in one of the leading cases, Stone v. Daviess County Division
of Children and Family Services,20 the court held that the ADA had no
impact on termination statutes, and thus, if the parents' ADA rights
had been violated their only remedy was to bring a separate
proceeding. 21
While the ADA consists of five titles covering areas such as employment, public accommodation, and transportation,22 this Comment concerns the ADA as it applies to Title II. The Comment asserts that an alleged violation of the ADA should not be a defense
in termination of parental rights proceedings. As background for
this assertion, Part II describes the termination of parental rights
process in Maryland.23 Part III discusses the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, and the rights it affords parents
to raise and direct the upbringing of their children. 24 Part IV describes the history and the purpose of the ADA. 25 Part V analyzes
state and federal case law regarding alleged ADA violations in termination of parental rights cases. 26 Part VI discusses how Maryland
courts may rule on the issue, as it is one of first impression in the
State. 27 The Comment concludes in Part VII that a violation of the
ADA is not a valid defense against termination of parental rights. 28

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

27.
28.

stantive law."); In 11! B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding
that "tennination of parental rights proceedings are not 'services, programs
or activities' within the meaning of the ADA"); In 11! B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 720
(Vt. 1997) (holding that the "ADA docs not directly apply to [tennination of
parental rights] proceedings"); In 11! Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the ADA is not a basis to attack a tennination of
parental rights order, however, it may be a basis for a separate cause of action).
See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 829-30.
656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
See id. at 830.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (employment); 12181-12189 (public accommodation); see also infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 29-104 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 105-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 176-215 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 216-320 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 321-64 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 365-68 and accompanying text.
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II.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN MARYLAND

A.

Seroice Programs

Legislative policy in Maryland requires the promotion of family
stability, the preservation of family unity, and the assistance of families in achieving and maintaining self-reliance. 29 In accordance with
this policy, each local Department of Social Services (DSS) developed a program offering services to families with children. 30 These
programs are available to families who receive temporary monetary
aid or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) ,31 and families whose
gross income is 80% or less than the median adjusted income for a
Maryland family of similar size. 32 These programs offer assistance
where the family, faced with a crisis,33 needs help in locating and using community services,34 family counseling,35 or home management
services. 36

B.

Statutory Scheme

Unfortunately, situations often exist where these services or
programs are not enough. For example, where children continue to
be abused37 and neglected,38 Subtitle Seven of Title Five of the Ma29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4401(1) (1999).
See id. § 4402(a).
See id. § 4402 (a) (1). As part of the federal Social Security Act, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) provides funding for individuals who are over 65 years
of age, blind, or disabled and have limited financial resources. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381, 1382(a).
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4402(a) (2). Maryland's median adjusted income per family is determined by the Social Services Administration. See id.
See id. § 4402 (b) (1). The crisis must be brought on by a devastating event
such as loss of income, loss of home, physical or mental illness, death, desertion, or abandonment. See id.
See id. § 4402(b)(3). Such services include health services. See id.
See id. § 4402(b)(2). Counseling would be given to resolve marital, family, or
parent-child conflicts, or to help parents learn proper parenting skills. See id.
See id. § 4402(b) (4). This counseling program teaches parents how to run
their household and how to make and maintain a budget. See id.
See id. § 5-701(b) (defining abuse as "the physical or mental injury of a child
by any parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a child . . . under Circumstances
that indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk
of being harmed").
See id. § 5-701(r) (defining neglect as "the leaving of a child unattended or
other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent or
other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under circumstances that indicate: (1) that the
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ryland Annotated Code, Family Law Article (Family Law Article) addresses this gap by protecting children against abuse and neglect by
their natural parents. 39 The subtitle governs custody, guardianship,
adoption, and general protections against parental abuse.40
This comprehensive statutory scheme requires police officers,
doctors, nurses, health care practitioners, teachers, and human services workers to report any belief that a child has been abused or
neglected by hern parents. 42 The report must be made to the local
DSS or to a local law enforcement agency.43 There is also a statutory
duty placed on the general public to make a report to the local police or DSS when reasons exist to believe that a child has been
abused or neglected by her parents. 44
Subtitle Seven's statutory scheme directs DSS, once contacted
by a teacher, doctor, neighbor, or other person alleging child abuse
or neglect, to begin an investigation promptly.45 When physical or
sexual abuse is alleged, DSS must investigate within twenty-four
hours of the report,46 and when neglect or mental injury is alleged,
the period for investigation is extended to five days.47 DSS then assigns a case worker to investigate the report, which begins by meeting with the child. 48
While conducting an investigation, it is entirely appropriate for
the social worker to check the child for bruises and other signs of
abuse. 49 If the child is of school age, the social worker may speak

39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

child's health or welfare is hanned or placed at substantial risk of significant
hann; or (2) mental injury to the child or a substantial risk of mental injury") .
See generally id. §§ 5-701-715 (addressing child abuse and neglect).
See id.
Throughout this Comment the feminine fonn of pronouns will be used, however, as is obvious, the material in this Comment applies in a gender-neutral
manner.
See id. § 5-704 (a) .
See id.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705(a). An example of this would be when a
neighbor sees a parent abusing a child or leaving a child alone at home and
then reports the incident to the police or DSS.
See id. § 5-706(a).
See id. § 5-706(b).
See id.
See id. § 5-706 (b) (1).
See Interview with CJ. Messerschmidt, Assistant Attorney General, Department
of Human Resources, in Baltimore, Md. (Feb. 11, 2000) (CJ. Messerschmidt
works on appellate claims in the area of termination of parental rights)
(notes on file with the author).
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with and examine the child at schoopo If the child is not of school
age, the social worker must go to the home to interview and examine the child. 51 In addition, the social worker must attempt to
have an at-home interview with the child's caretaker52 and make a
determination as to the child's safety.53 To determine if the child
has been mentally abused, the social worker will arrange for the
child to be seen by two of the following: 54 a licensed physician,55 a
licensed social worker,56 or a licensed psychologist. 57
If the DSS investigation concludes that a child has been abused
or neglected, DSS's initial goal is to keep the family together. 58 To
encourage this goal, the Maryland General Assembly codified support services that the State must provide to preserve family unity. 59
These services must be offered to families before children are
placed in the custody of the State. 60 If an emergency situation exists,61 the child can be removed from the home into the custody of
the State, and services will be offered to reunite the child and the
parents. 62
However, often the services provided to the parents do not
help. In these cases, an administrative hearing is necessary to deter50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.

62.

Id.
Id. If the parent resists allowing the social worker into the home, the police
will accompany the social worker and make sure the social worker sees the
child. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-709(b).
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-706 (b) (2).
See id. § 5-706(b) (3).
See id. § 5-706(c).
See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 14-101(g) (2000) (defining the qualifications of a licensed physician).
See id. § 19-101(d) (defining the qualifications of a licensed social worker).
See id. § 18-101(d) (defining the qualifications of a licensed psychologist).
See COMAR 07.02.11.14.A (1999).
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-401 (1) (i) (1999). The Department of Social
Services (DSS) must offer functional services, family counseling, referral services, and services concerning home management. See id. § 4-402(b) (2). DSS
may also provide travel expenses to and from these services. See COMAR
07.02.11.14.B. In an effort to help preserve the family, other services may be
provided, which include, but are not limited to, day care services and vocational counseling and training. See id. The vast majority of children in Maryland who come in contact with the foster care system are reunified with their
parents. See Interview with CJ. Messerschmidt, supra note 49.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-401(2).
An example of such a situation would be when a child has been left home
alone with no one to care for her and someone contacts social services or the
police. See Interview with CJ. Messerschmidt, supra note 49.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-525 (b) (1).
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mine whether a child is a "child in need of assistance" (CINA) .63
Once determined to be a CINA by the court, she may temporarily
be placed in the custody of the State, and put in an out-of-home
placement program. 64 During that time, a permanency plan is established for the child placed out of the home,65 with the goal to provide services to the parents so that the parents and child may eventually reunite. 66
There are times when no services can help to reunite the child
and the parent. 67 In these instances, the State does not have to
meet its statutory obligation of providing services before removing
the child from the home or terminating the parental rights of the

63.

64.
65.

66.

67.

See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(e) (1998). A child who is
deemed to be a child in need of assistance (CINA) "requires the assistance of
the court because: (1) [t]he child is mentally handicapped or is not receiving
ordinary and proper care and attention; and (2) [t]he child's parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to
the child and the child's problems." Id. A child cannot be determined a CINA
solely because the parent is homeless. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5525 (c) (2)(i) (1999). The local DSS is responsible for finding the parent and
the child shelter so they can remain together. See id. § 5-525 (c) (2) (ii).
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-525(a).
See id. § 5-525(b)(2). During the out-of-home placement, the local DSS is responsible for providing care for the child 24 hours a day. See id. § 5-525 (c).
This out-of-home placement can be established through placement of the
child into foster care, kinship care, group care, or residential treatment care.
See id. at § 5-501 (m). This care is to be on a short term basis. See id. § 5525(c).
See id. § 5-525 (b) (1). The best interest of the child is considered in developing
the permanency plan. See id. § 5-525(e) (describing the development of the
permanency plan and listing factors to be considered in determining a permanency plan that is in the best interest of the child). See also infra notes 8182 and accompanying text.
See generally Robert F. Kelly, Family Preservation and Reunification Programs in
Child Protection Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications far Legal Representation, Judicial Practice and Public Policy, 34 FAM. L.Q. 359, 364 (2000) (placing children with biological parents was preferred although other arrangements would be made if this was not possible); Susan V. Mangold, Extending
Non-Exclusive Parenting and the Right to Protection far Older Foster Children: Creating
Third Options in Permanency, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 835, 877 (2000) (discussing the
necessity to plan for children in foster care who are not reunited with families); Sean D. Ronan, Comment, No Discretion, Heightened Tension: The Tale of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act in New York State, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 949, 968
(2000) (according to New York's Adoption and Safe Families Act, reasonable
efforts are not necessary to reunite children with biological parents whose parental rights to another child have been terminated).
0
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natural parents. 68 For example, in In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
J970013,69 the parental rights of a father were terminated without
DSS offering services to help the family stay together. 70 The court
noted that the father had a significant interest in raising his child,
but found that the best interest of the child71 was best served by terminating the father's parental rights. 72 Therefore, the court held
that DSS did not have to provide any services toward the reunification of the father with his child, as they would be futile. 73
Again, in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, the court
found providing services before terminating the parental rights was
unnecessary.74 The court found that the mother was mentally ill and
68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

See In 111 Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 & CAA 92-10853, 103 Md.
App. 1, 19-20, 651 A.2d 891, 900 (1994) (repeating that social services does
not have to meet its statutory obligations to provide services before terminating parental rights "if no amount of services [would] result in reunification of
the parent with his or her child").
128 Md. App. 242, 252-56, 737 A.2d 604, 610 (1999) (holding that the termination of the parental rights of an incarcerated father was in the best interest of
the child).
See id. at 254-56, 737 A.2d at 611-12. The father had been convicted of drugrelated first degree murder and sentenced to 20 years to life in jail. See id. at
246, 737 A.2d at 606. While in jail, the father participated in parenting classes,
completed a drug program and attended group meetings on anger management. See id. at 246, 737 A.2d at 607. The mother's rights were also terminated, but she did not appeal. See id. at 245 n.l, 737 A.2d at 606 n.1.
See id. at 252, 737 A.2d at 610; see also MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 5-525(e)
(listing factors to be considered in determining what is in the best interests of
a child); In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 & CAA 92-10853,
103 Md. App. 1, 10-13, 651 A.2d 891, 896-97 (1994) (discussing the factors
used to determine the best interests of a child).
See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. J970013, 128 Md. App. at 256-57, 737
A.2d at 612. The court did not want to place the child's welfare in "legal
limbo" because of the scant possibility that his father someday would be released. Id.
See id. at 256, 737 A.2d at 612. The court found that the father was not able to
provide the basic necessities for his child. See id. The father's situation was
"persistent and ongoing," and he could be in jail for the rest of his life. Id. at
256, 737 A.2d at 612. But see In 111 Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852
& CAA 92-10853, 103 Md. App. 1, 29-30, 651 A.2d 891, 910 (1994) (holding
that when there is a short jail term, the State must try to reunite the child
and father before termination proceedings would be justified).
335 Md. 99, 113, 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1993) (clarifying "that the controlling factor in adoption and custody cases is not the natural parent's interest in raising the child, but rather what best serves the interest of the child"). There,
the mother suffered from severe mental illnesses. See id. at 106, 642 A.2d at
205. She never had a permanent residence, often stayed in homeless shelters,
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unfit to be a parent, and probably would never be fit to parent. 75
Thus, the court held that no services could help reunite the mother
with her child,76 and the mother's parental rights could be terminated without any services offered to her.77
C.

Permanency Plan

As noted earlier, once the court determines that a child is a
CINA, DSS must define a permanency plan. 7s In creating a permanency plan for the child, DSS considers what is in the best interest
of the child. 79 The factors that are taken into account when determining the best interest of the child include: the child's emotional
bond to her parents and siblings; the child's emotional bond to her
present caretaker; how long the child has been living with her present caretaker; the potential harm to the child if she is removed
from the home of her present caretaker; and the potential harm to
the child if she remains in the custody of the State for a prolonged
period of time. so
When DSS devises a permanency plan for the child, the first
consideration is to return the child to her parents or legal guardian. s1 If that is not in the child's best interests, the second consideration is to place the child with a relative who is willing to adopt or
act as a guardian to the child. 82 If there is no relative willing to
adopt or act as a guardian, then DSS seeks foster parents willing to
adopt the child. s3

D.

Termination Without the Natural Parents' Consent

In order for the child to be legally adopted by foster parents
without the consent of the natural parents, the court must terminate the parental rights of the natural parents. 84 The court must

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

84.

did not have a job, and did not try to get treatment for her mental conditions. See id. at 118, 642 A.2d at 210-11.
See id. at 118-19, 642 A.2d at 211.
See id. at 119, 642 A.2d at 211.
See id.
See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-525 (b) (2) (1999).
See id. § 5-525 (e) (1).
See id. § 5-525 (e) (2) (i).
See id. § 5-525 (e) (2) (ii).
See id. § 5-525 (e)(2) (iii). If the present foster parent does not want to adopt
the child, then DSS will place the child with another approved adoptive family. See id.
See id. § 5-313(a); § 5-312(b).
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find by clear and convincing evidence 85 that it is in the best interest
of the childs6 to terminate the parental rights of the natural parents. S7 When making this decision, the court must consider several
factors. 88
Mter giving primary consideration to the safety and health of
the child,s9 the court first looks at the services provided to the family in an attempt to reunite the child with her natural parents. 90 Second, if an agreement exists between the parents and DSS, the court
85.

86.

87.

88.

89.
90.

See id. § 5-313(a). The Supreme Court has held that a state must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the parental rights of the natural parents, and that a lesser standard
of proof is a violation of the natural parents' due process rights. See Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 74748 (1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State support its allegations by
clear and convincing evidence before parental rights can be terminated).
Some States have adopted the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt
in termination proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387, 1389
(N.H. 1978) (mandating that the government must prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt before the termination of parental rights can occur).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the best interest of the child as
the applicable standard in determining contested adoption and custody cases.
See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561, 640 A.2d
1085, 1096 (1994).
In addition to finding that the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, the court must also find that one of three additional factors is present. The court must find that the child has been abandoned such
that the identity of the child's natural parents is unknown, and no one has
claimed to be the child's natural parents in the past two months; or the court
must find that in a prior juvenile proceeding the child has been deemed a
CINA, an abused child, a neglected child, or a dependant child; or finally the
court must find that the following circumstances exists: the child has been out
of the custody of the natural parent and in the custody of DSS for at least
one year; the reasons for the removal of the child still exist or circumstances
of a possibly harmful nature still exist; it is unlikely that the situation will be
rectified so that the child could return to the natural parents in the near future; and the continued relationship with the natural parents would be damaging to a child developing a strong and solid relationship with a permanent
family. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(a) (1999).
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(c); see supra note 80 and accompanying
text for an enumeration of best interest factors, as well as infra notes 334-35
and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's standard in Maryland
for terminating parental rights.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (c) (1).
See id. § 5-313(c) (2)(i). The court will look into when the services were offered, what kinds of services were offered, and the extent of the services offered to the family. See id.
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must determine if both parties to the agreement satisfied their responsibilities. 91 Third, the court must consider the child's feelings. 92
Fourth, the court assesses the natural parents' efforts to change
their circumstances, behavior, and lifestyle, that led to the removal
of the child. 93
When a child has previously been deemed either a CINA, a neglected child, or an abused child, a court considers additional factors before parental rights are terminated. 94 These additional factors
include: (1) whether the natural parent has a disability that leaves
the parent regularly unable to care for the child for extended periods;95 (2) whether the natural parent abused or neglected any child
in the family previously;96 (3) whether the natural parent has continually failed to provide food, shelter, clothing, schooling, and any
other necessary care to. the child, despite the natural parent's finan91.
92.

93.

94.
95.

96.

See id. § 5-313 (c) (2) (iii).
See id. §§ 5-313 (c) (2) (iii),(iv). The child's emotional ties to her natural parents and to her siblings will be taken into account, as well as her adaptation
to home, school, and community. See id.
See id. § 5-313(c) (2) (v). The extent to which the natural parents tried to have
regular contact with the child in an attempt to be reunited with the child is
also considered. See id. Incidental visits, however, are not given much weight
by the court. See id. § 5-313(c) (2)(v)(1). The court also considers whether the
parents are able to contribute financially to the child; whether the natural
parents keep in contact with the child's current caretaker; and whether any
further services would help to rehabilitate the parents so that the child could
be returned. See id. §§ 5-313(c) (2) (v) (2-4).
See id. § 5-313(d) (mandating that these factors be considered in addition to
the factors in subsection c).
See id. § 5-313(d)(1)(i). The disabilities applicable to this section include a
mental disorder (defined in MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 10-101(£);
mental retardation, (defined in § 7-101(l); alcohol dependance, (defined in
§ 8-101(£); and drug dependance, (defined in § 8-101(l)). See MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAw § 5-301(c). However, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held
that the fact that a parent is an alcoholic is not grounds by itself to remove
the child from the home. See In re William B., 73 Md. App. 68, 73, 533 A.2d
16, 19 (1987). The State must also show that the parent's drinking affects the
parent's ability to care for the child. See id. The court of special appeals also
held that a parent's incarceration does not constitute a disability. See In re
Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852 & CAA 92-10853, 103 Md. App. 1,
29, 651 A.2d 891, 905 (1994) (holding that a father serving a nine month
term was not under a disability). But see In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
J970013, 128 Md. App. 242, 252-53, 737 A.2d 604, 610-11 (1999) (holding that
although incarceration was not a disability per se, it was in the best interest of
a child to terminate the parental rights of a father serving a 20 year to life
sentence).
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(d) (1) (ii).
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cial ability to do SO;97 or (4) whether the child was born addicted to
drugs or alcohol, and the parent refused to enter a detoxification
program. 98
Furthermore, sometimes there are exceptional circumstances99
that a court must consider when deciding to terminate the parental
rights of the natural parents. 1oo If a court decides not to terminate
the parental rights, the child either remains in foster care or returns home. 101 Reunification services should continue at this
point. 102 Nonetheless, the judge may still order termination of the
parent's rights.
Once the parental rights of the natural parents have been terminated and the appellate process has been exhausted, the judgment is final and irrevokable. 103 The consequences of this drastic
and permanent severing of the strongest and most basic relationship led the Maryland Legislature and courts to ensure that termination of parental rights does not occur over parental objection,
unless it is clearly justified. The welfare and best interest of the
child must be weighed with great care against every just claim of an
objecting parent. 104
97.
98.
99.
100.

101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. § 5-313(d)(1)(iii).
See id. § 5-313(d) (1) (iv).
See In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561-62, 640 A.2d
1085, 1096-97 (1994).
See id. According to the court:
The factors which emerge . . . include the length of time the child
has been away from the biological parent, the age of the child when
care was assumed by the third party, the possible emotional effect on
the child of a change of custody, the period of time which elapsed
before the parent sought to reclaim the child, the nature and
strength of the ties between the child and the third party custodian,
the intensity and genuineness of the parent's desire to have the
child, [and] the stability and certainty as to the child's future in the
custody of the parent.
Id. at 561-62, 648 A.2d at 1097 (quoting Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191,
372 A.2d 582, 593 (1977».
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(d)(5).
See id. § 5-524(2) (mandating that services should be provided to reunite the
child with her parents after the child has been placed in foster care).
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,759 (1982) (holding that a New York decision terminating parental rights is final).
Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275-76 (1960) (recognizing
the serious consequences of adoption on the relationship between child and
the natural parent); see also Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 14, 497 A.2d 142, 148
(1985) (remanding to the trial court to consider if adoption would be in the
best interest of the child involved).
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III. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits any State from depriving "apy person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. 105 The Due Process Clause provides individuals substantive l06 and procedural107 protections in matters that are so fundamental to life that they are beyond the reach
of governmental interference. Because parenting is recognized as a
fundamental right,108 governmental intrusion is only warranted in
limited circumstances. 109 Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause is used by parents in matters of family life.
A.

Parent's Fundamental Rights

The Supreme Court first challenged a State's power to interfere
with a parent's right in directing the upbringing of children in
1923.110 The Court established a parent's right to "establish a home
and bring up children" as one of the fundamental liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 11
Recognizing that substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment afforded a parent the right to direct the upbringing of
their children, the Court struck down a state statute prohibiting the
teaching of foreign languages at an elementary school. ll2 This early
recognition of an area of family privacy, in which the State may not

105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
106. See infra notes 111-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substantive safeguards afforded to families through the Due Process clause, and infra
notes 135-36 for the minimum requirements needed to satisfy the substantive
component of the Due Process clause.
107. See infra note 134 and accompanying text for the requirement needed to satisfy the procedural aspect of the Due Process clause.
108. See infra note 133 for references to the fundamental importance of the parent-child relationship.
109. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text for an introduction of the
States' permitted limitations on freedom; infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text for a general discussion of States' authority to regulate; infra notes
139-51 and accompanying text discussing States' police power regulation; and
infra notes 152-58 explaining States' regulation under the doctrine of parens
patriae.
110. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that parents have a
fundamental right to teach their children a foreign language).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 399. In Meyer, the Court stated that "[w]ithout doubt, [Due Process
of the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the [parent] to ... bring up children. n [d.
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interfere,113 set the stage for a series of subsequent cases that "focused on the right of parents to make important decisions regarding their children's upbringing. "114
Just two years later, the Court held in Pierce v. Society oj Sistersll5
that the constitutional "liberty of parents and guardians" includes
the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control. "116 The notion of family autonomy was reinforced
when the Court invalidated a state statute requiring parents to educate their children in public schools.l17 The Court reasoned that
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations. "118
In 1944, the Court declared in Prince v. Massachusetts 119 that
"[i] t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside[s] first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include[s] preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder."l20 Although the State's regulation of child labor
in this case prevailed over the guardian's desire to allow her nine
year old niece to sell religious literature on a city street, the Court
spoke of the importance of parental rights, emphasizing a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter."121
Parental rights were further defined in 1972, when the Court in
Wisconsin v. Yodd 22 invalidated a state statute requiring all children
to attend school until the age of sixteen. l23 Although the Court's decision was largely based upon the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause, the Court explicitly reasoned that "when the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim ... more than
merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's
113. See id.
114. See Holly L. Robinson,Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. REv.

27,4849 (1985).
115. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
116. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding that Oregon Compulsory Education Act requiring attendance at public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
117. See id.
118. Id. at 535.
119. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
120. Id. at 166 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925».
121. Id.
122. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
123. See id.
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requirement under the First Amendment. "124 The Court expressed
the significance of family autonomy by stating that "[ t] he primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."l25
By the 1980s, Justice Stewart made it clear in Lassiter v. Department of Social Seruices126 that the tradition of family unity and autonomy would continue to be a significant factor in cases involving parental rights. 127 He wrote that "[t]his Court's decisions have by now
made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent's
desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.' "128
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly established that parents have
a constitutionally protected right to direct many aspects of the upbringing of their children even though this right is not expressly
stated in the Constitution. 129 Believing that the "process of teaching,
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the
growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens,"130
the Court continues to afford great deference to parental rights in
many cases.
B.

The State's Rights

Although parental rights are deemed fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution, they are not absolute. 131 Notwithstanding
the Court's establishment of family autonomy and integrity, under
certain circumstances the parent-child relationship may also be regulated by a State.132

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 233.
See id. at 232 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925».
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
See id.
[d. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972».
See id.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1979) (Powell, j., concurring).
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (clarifying that a parent's right to care for a child is
important, but that a State may infringe upon the right if there is a legitimate
interest).
132. See supra notes 10, 18-21, 41-42, 44-57 and accompanying text.
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Substantive Due Process Requirements

State interference with a parent's rights is subject to judicial review and must meet certain standards of procedural and substantive
due process. 133 Procedural due process requires the government to
provide a fair procedure when depriving parents of their liberty interest in rearing their children.134 However, when reviewing substantive due process issues the Court is "concerned with the constitutionality of the underlying rule rather than with the fairness of the
process by which the government applies the rule to an individual."135 Substantive due process requires the Court "to examine a
law, including a court ruling, [to determine] whether the substantive rule of law is an unconstitutional limitation of life, liberty, or
property interests. "136
A State's authority to regulate is drawn from two distinct authorities; the State's police power granted by the Constitution,137
and the doctrine of parens patriaePS Under police power, the State
133. See M.L.B. v. S.L]., 519 U.S. 102, 122-23 (1996) (holding that due process was
violated when indigent mother was denied appeal of termination of parental
right on the sole basis that she could not afford to pay mandatory fee for the
preparation of a trial court record); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972) (invalidating a state statute requiring children to attend high school,
because the statute violated the rights of Amish parents to educate their children in a religious atmosphere); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 53435, (1925) (holding that Oregon Compulsory Education Act requiring attendance at public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (striking statute forbidding parents to teach
children a foreign language); In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 63 (1979) (upholding procedural and substantive due process challenge
of the statute and process under which mother's parental rights were terminated); see also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONST.
LAw, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 18.30 (West 3d. ed. 1999) [hereinafter "RoTUNDA"] (stating that since the first parental cases in the 1920s, such cases
continue to strongly weigh the fundamental constitutional importance of the
parent-child and family relationships, and they cannot be terminated without
meeting the standards of procedural and substantive due process).
134. See ROTUNDA, supra note 133, at § 14.6.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The Tenth Amendment is considered to be the source of state police power
and provides that "[ t] he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 397400 (1923) (discussing state police power).
138. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
"Parens patriae," literally "parent of the country," refers traditionally

2000]

Parental Rights and the ADA

363

is allowed to regulate certain family matters in order to promote
family values!39 or matters of "public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."l40 The doctrine of parens patriae generally allows the
State to act in the best interest of the child's welfare when a parent's or guardian's control falters.141
As the Court established in its earliest decisions, a State may
not regulate parental rights with its police powers "under the guise
of protecting the public interest."142 In order to justifY this levying
of authority for the public interest under its police powers, the
State must show that it is in the interest of the public at large, and
not just a specific group of individuals. 143 The State must further
to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane, and in child custody detenninations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of
the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who
cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care
and custody from their parents.

Id.
139. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (validating a land use
project which allowed taking of property despite landowner's claim "for ridding an area of slums") (citing Bennan v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954». "The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places. It is ample to layout zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for peo.ple." Id. at 9. In Berman v. Parker, the Court noted: "Public safety, public
health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to
municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not
delimit it." Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
140. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). In Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court validated a zoning statute forbidding "apartment houses, business houses, retail stores and shops" from residential districts, and reasoning that "before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare." Id. at 366, 395. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25
(1905) (holding that a compulsory vaccination law is a valid exercise of police
power).
141. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (recognizing that children "are
assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control
falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae").
142. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399400 (1923).
143. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) ("To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear-First, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference . . . .").
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show that the means required for the achievement of the purpose
are not unnecessarily oppressive. l44 When issues arise regarding the
constitutionality of a state regulation under its police powers, the
Court will balance the State's interest with the liberty interest of the
parent's rights in raising children. 145
Some state regulations authorized under police powers are
deeply rooted in the American tradition, generally accepted as commonplace, and often go unchallenged. Such regulations include
child labor laws,l46 compulsory school attendance,147 mandatory vaccinations,l48 age requirement for marriage,149 prohibiting the sale of
pornographic material,150 and criminalizing child abuse and
neglect. 151
144. See id. ("To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear... that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.").
145. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests . . . . ").
146. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("Acting to guard the
general interest in youth's well being, the State as parens patriae may restrict
the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting
the child's labor, and in many other ways.") (citations omitted).
147. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (holding that a State has
the power to impose reasonable regulations of its citizen's education).
148. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (" . . . [u]pon the
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right
to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of
its members.")
149. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y 1981), afFd, 669
F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982) (upholding New York's law
requiring parental consent for marriages of persons between the ages of 14
and 18).
150. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("The well-being of its
children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate, and, in our view ... at least if it was rational for the legislature to find
that the minors' exposure to such material might be harmful.").
151. See, e.g., Faust v. State, 354 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. 1978) (upholding the language of a statute defining the offense of aggravated child abuse); State v.
Fahy, 440 P.2d 566, 569-70 (Kan. 1968) (upholding a statute proscribing torture and abuse of child under 16 years of age); State v. Sinica, 372 N.W.2d
445, 447 (Neb. 1985) (upholding a child abuse statute); State v. Lucero, 531
P.2d 1215, 1218 (N.M. 1975) (holding that the objective of cruelty to children
was a sufficient interest for the State to regulate under its police powers);
State v. Fredell, 195 S.E.2d 300, 304 (N.C. 1973) (holding that a statute providing that any parent of a child less than 16 years of age who inflicted physical
injury on the child by other than accidental means was guilty of the misde-
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The State's power of parens patriae for children is premised on
principles that define and limit its power in interfering with family
unity. First, there is a presumption that children lack the maturity
and mental competence of adults.152 Second, recognizing that
"[ t] he child is not the mere creature of the State, "153 the State must
prove that the parents are either unable, unwilling or unfit to adequately care for the child. 154 Third, the State must show that it is exercising its parens patriae power solely to advance the best interest
of the child. 155 Finally, the State must show it is advancing a Q"compelling state interest."156

152.

153.
154.

155.

156.

meanor of child abuse, was "a reasonable and proper exercise of the police
power of the State").
"Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of
themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents,
and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae."
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in result) ("[A]t least in some
precisely delineated areas, a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.
It is only upon such a premise ... that a State may deprive children of other
rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to vote-deprivations
that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults."); Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 603 (1989) ("Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not
able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions . . . .").
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (unanimous Court). In
Qy,illoin, the Court stated that there would be little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a State were to attempt to force the
breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so
was thought to be in the children's best interest." Id. at 555 (quoting Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment»; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) ("We
do not question the assertion that neglectful parents may be separated from
their children . . . [however] the State registers no gain towards its declared
goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.").
"Countless custody cases in all fifty states have used the standard phrase, 'the
best interest of the child.'" Gregory A. Kelson, In the Best Interest of the Child:
What Have We Learned From Baby Jessica and Baby Richard?, 33 J.M. ARLR 353,
371 (2000).
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) ("[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' guarantee of 'due process of law' to include a substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.") (citations
omitted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (holding that a law re-
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When the State acts under the power of parens patriae, It IS
generally to remove a child from a home or to terminate parental
rights. 157 When a parent's right threatens the welfare of the child,
the State may regulate these rights to protect the child's welfare,
safety, and best interest. 15S
2.

Procedural Due Process Requirements

As parental rights are important constitutional liberties,
" [w] hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it
must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. "159 In
proceedings to terminate parental rights, the Supreme Court has
determined "[t] he nature of the process due ... turns on a balancing of three factors: the private interests affected by the proceedings; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and
the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure." 160
The Supreme Court has determined that procedural due process requires the State to prove its case against a parent by clear
and convincing evidence in proceedings to terminate parental
rights. 161 In Santosky v. Kramer,162 the Supreme Court refused to permit the State to terminate a parent's rights. 163 The Court overruled

157.

158.

159.
160.
161.

162.
163.

quiring high school attendance infringed upon the parent's right to direct
the religious upbringing and education of their children; only those interests
of the "highest order" can overcome those parental rights).
See Cheryl M. Browing & Michael L. Weiner, Note, The Right to Family Integrity:
A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68
GEO. LJ. 213, 214 (1979).
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (recognizing that the
State, empowered as parens patriae, may limit parents' rights where the
child's safety is threatened); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(recognizing that a State, acting as parens patriae, may restrict parents' rights
to protect the welfare of the child); Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp,
231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913) (recognizing that a State may restrict parents' control in order to guard a child's well-being by requiring school attendance).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (1982).
Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976».
See id. at 765-68. The Court reasoned in Santosky that the use of a preponderance standard would equate to near neutrality "between erroneous termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights." Id. at
765. The Court reasoned that the preponderance standard was "constitutionally intolerable" because of the "relative severity" of the consequences of erroneous decisions in termination proceedings. Id. at 766-68.
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
See id. at 747.
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the State's decision to terminate, reasoning that a parent's liberty_
interest in raising her child is substantial, and thus the State must
meet a higher burden of proof in order to interfere with those
rights. l64 The Court stated that the higher burden of proof minimized the risk of an "inappropriate termination" of parental
rights. 165
The Supreme Court altered its trend of deference toward parental rights in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services. l66 There, the
Court ruled that due process does not automatically require an indigent parent to be appointed counsel in proceedings to terminate
parental rights. 167 Although the Court ruled in favor of the State,
the Court reached its decision through a balancing test. 168 After
finding a presumption that an indigent parent has a right to counsel when her personal freedom is at stake, the Court measured the
presumption against" [the] private interests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions. "169 In balancing the three elements, the scale is
weighed "against the presumption that there is a right to appointed
counsel only where the indigent, if she is unsuccessful, may lose her
personal freedom. "170
Although the Court acknowledged that a "unique kind of deprivation" is involved in parental termination proceedings,l7l the
Court determined that the parent's interests in Lassiter did not rebut the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel.172 In
balancing the elements, the Court considered the detriment that
the parent already caused her children to suffer, her lack of interest
in prior parental rights proceedings, and the fact that counsel
would not have altered the outcome of the case.173
The Court made it clear in Lassiter that the right to counsel in
parental termination proceedings involving indigent parents is determined by the trial judge on a case-by-case basis, subject to appel-

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. at 759.
[d. at 764-65.
452 U.S. 18 (1981).
See id. at 32-33.
See id.
[d. at 27.
[d.
[d. at 26-27.
172. See id. at 33.
173. See id. at 32-33.
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late review. 174 In effect, the Lassiter holding now requires an examination of whether procedural due process mandates appointment of
counsel in all indigent parental termination proceedings. 175 Thus,
this process provides a protective measure for a child who suffers
from a parent's lack of proper care or attention.

IV. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A.

Historical Purpose of the ADA

Before the enactment of the ADA, the Federal Rehabilitation
Act was the only civil rights legislation that afforded rights to the
disabled. Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, all state programs
and services receiving federal funding could not deny services to
the disabled based on their disabilities. 176 Mter five years of research, hearings, and discussions, Congress unanimously passed the
ADA to combat discrimination of the disabled.177 The ADA extended the nondiscrimination policy of the Rehabilitation Act to all
actions of state and local governments, regardless of funding. 178 The
ADA seeks to assure the disabled are provided the same rights as
the non-disabled by creating a cause of action for those who have
faced discrimination because of disabilities. 179 Congress determined
that disabled individuals were being denied vital opportunities such
as employment, education, housing, transportation, and health services solely as a result of their disabilities. 18o Congress designed the
ADA to ensure that disabled persons are no longer denied public
or private services, programs, or activities because of the unfounded
fears, prejudice, or ignorance of others. 181

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

179.
180.
181.

See id. at 31-32.
See id.
See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
See DEPT. OF EDUC., OFFlCE OF CIVIL RlGHTS, ADA COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DlSABIUTIES Acr 1 (1990).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. II 1991). The Rehabilitation Act applied only to
entities that received federal funding. See 29 U.S.C. § 701. The ADA encompasses much of the language of the Rehabilitation Act, and therefore the Rehabilitation Act and its case law are important in interpreting the ADA.
See 42 U.S.c. § 12101(b).
See id. § 12101 (a)(3).
See generally id. § 12101. (enunciating the ADA's purpose of eliminating discrimination and providing standards, enforceable by the federal and state governments).
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Title II of the ADA

Title II of the ADA requires public entities to provide physical
access to programs and services offered. 182 In addition, Title II ensures that such services and activities are readily accessible to, and
usable by, qualified individuals with disabilities. 183 Denial of access
to any program, service, or facility violates the ADA.l84 In order to
prove that a violation occurred, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that she has a disability,185 (2) that she is "otherwise
qualified" for the benefit that has been denied, (3) that she
was either excluded for participation in or denied benefits
of some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or
was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity,
and, (4) that such discrimination was by reason of plaintiff's
disability. 186

The ADA defines a qualified individual as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modification to rules, policies, or practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for
the receipt of services or participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity."187
Title II states that a person alleging an ADA violation may
bring a complaint under the public entity's grievance procedure,
file an administrative complaint with a corresponding federal
agency or the Department of Justice, or file an individual complaint. 1ss However, Title II does not specify how to implement grievance procedures. 189 Rather regulations have been promulgated to
address these procedures. These regulations seems to suggest that if
182. See id. § 12132.
183. See Watson v. Utah, No. 954190, 1996 WL 70521, at *8 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 1996)
(per curiam) (re-emphasizing that the purpose of the Act is to assure the accessibility of programs and services to qualified individuals with disabilities).
184. See id.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability of an individual under the ADA
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual").
186. Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV 94-5796 ~D, 1996 WL
684426, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996) (citing Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health
& Hosps. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (setting forth the elements for an ADA violation».
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994).
188. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENT CENTER, INC.. ADA TITLE II ACTION GUIDE FOR STATE
& LOCAL GoVERNMENT 11-12 (1992).
189. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.107(b) (2000).
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the public entity already has other grievance procedures in place,
the entity may use those procedures for complaints of ADA
violations. l90
The ADA Title II Action Guide1 91 recommends that when implementing a grievance procedure, the procedure should specify in detail how to file a complaint of an ADA violation. 192 The procedures
should also allow the decision to be appealed, and specify a reasonable time period for a review and a decision on the complaint. 193 A
system should also keep accurate track of filed complaints, and the
steps taken to resolve the complaint. 194
Title II specifies that when an individual brings their own lawsuit alleging a violation of the ADA, that person may receive injunctive relief and attorney's fees and cost. 195 However, the individual is
not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages. 196
C.

State Defenses to Application of the ADA

Exceptions exist to state compliance with Title II of the ADA. A
state need not comply if it can show that compliance may cause an
undue burden on the service or program, or reasonable modifications may fundamentally alter the nature of the service or program,
or pose a direct threat to health or safety.197
1.

Reasonable modification

The ADA allows reasonable modifications, unless the modification "would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program,
or activity. "198 The ADA does not explicitly define "reasonable modifications" but requires a state to "make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures . . . where necessary" to avoid discriminating against the disabled on the basis of their disability.l99
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of reasonable modification as required by the Rehabilitation Act in Southeastern Community
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id.
supra note 188.
See id. at 41.
See id.
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 35.175 (2000).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12133; 28 C.F.R. § 35.175.
See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B. (2000).
[d. § 35.130(b)(7); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b) (1).

ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENT CENTER,
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College v. Davis. 2OO There, a woman with impaired hearing wanted to
attend nursing schooI.201 The school determined that, in order to
accommodate her disability, it would have to offer her a program of
only academic work because it could not in, good conscience allow
her to work on patients, even if they provided an individual faculty
advisor every time she saw patients. 202 The plaintiff argued the
school should offer her the option of only academic work to obtain
her degree or provide her with individual aid when she saw patients
to allow her to safely participate in the nursing program. 203 .
The Court held that the plaintiff was not an otherwise qualified
individual because "extensive modifications would be necessary to
accommodate her. "204 The Court defined otherwise qualified as an
individual who can meet all the requirements of the program in
spite of their disability.205 The Court found that the modifications
necessary would fundamentally alter the nature of the program and
were more than that required by the reasonable modification requirement of the Rehabilitation Act. 206
Using the Supreme Court's definition of "otherwise qualified,"
disabled plaintiffs appealing termination judgments will have
trouble proving that they are "'otherwise qualified' for the benefit
that has been denied. "21)7 It will be difficult because the benefit denied is the ability to parent their children. In order for the court to
terminate the parental rights, it would have found that the parents
are not able ("qualified") to act as parents to their children. 208
200. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). When interpreting the ADA, precedent of the Rehabilitation Act is used. See Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (discussing the deference given to the Rehabilitation Act, and how the Act does
not always require an entity to undertake substantial modifications).
201. See Southeastern Community College, 422 U.S. at 400.
202. See id. at 407.
203. See id.
204. [d. at 410.
205. See id. at 406.
206. See id. at 410. But see Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 133 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that the university must provide a sign language interpreter to deaf student to participate in University programs).
207. Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV 94-5796 RJD, 1996 WL
684426 at *10 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996) (discussing, via the plaintiff's case, the
difficulty complaintants face when alleging and organizing a violation of the
ADA).
208. See id. The court analogized their definition of "otherwise qualified" to the
definition in Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, which
held that within the context of employment an "otherwise qualified" person
is one who can perform the essential functions of their job. See Bradley v. Uni-
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Therefore, they are not otherwise qualified for the benefit of
parenting their children.209
The ADA also specifies that the accommodations are not reasonable if they require an undue financial or administrative burden. 210 The State has the burden of showing that it has examined
all possible financial sources and cannot find the funding to provide the accommodations. 211
2.

Direct threat

Title II of the ADA allows the State to deny services, programs,
or activities to individuals who pose a "direct threat" to the health
or safety of others.212 If an individual. is classified as a direct threat,
they are not an otherwise· qualified individual. 213 The Supreme
Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arlinfil14 balanced the interests of a disabled teacher with tuberculosis against the public safety
concerns of the school in preventing the transmission of the disease
to students. The Court held that a public entity may consider health
and safety risks in determining if a person is otherwise qualified for
services, programs, or activities.215
Using the direct threat test, States could seemingly avoid following the ADA where a parent threatens a child's health or safety.
Where parental rights are terminated, a court has already decided
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is a threat to the
health or safety of the child. Therefore, courts holding that the

versity of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1993).
209. See Morrison at *10-11. (highlighting the difficulty to be considered otherwise
qualified) .
210. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150; .164 (2000).
211. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (2000).
212. See id. § 36.208.
213. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
214. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
215. See id. at 288. In Arline, the plaintiff was fired from her job as a school teacher
because she had tuberculosis. See id. at 276. The Supreme Court remanded
the case and stated that to determine if a person poses a direct threat to
health and safety of others, the court should consider the nature, severity, duration of the disability, and the possibility of disease transmittal. See id. at 288.
On remand, the district court found that the medical evidence showed that
the plaintiff had been "cured" of tuberculosis and any chance that she could
infect others was "so extremely small as to not exist." [d. at 292. The Court
further stated that the plaintiff had been terminated not on the medical evidence, but on society's myths about the disease. See id.
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ADA does not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings
could use the direct threat test to support the reasoning.
V.

DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

A. Federal Court Decisions

To date only three cases addressing use of the ADA in appealing a termination of parental rights judgment have been brought
before the federal courts. 216 In the first case, Watson v. Utah,217 the
court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which the
federal courts could grant relief, and granted defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint. 21S The federal court stated that the defendants were absolutely immune from suits for damages and dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint. 219 In Watson, the plaintiff initiated a law
suit against the State of Utah and various state employees after her
parental rights had been terminated, and sought money damages as
well as i~unctive and declaratory relief.220 The plaintiff alleged, inter
alia, a violation of the ADA claiming that her parental rights were
terminated because she is blind. 221 The district court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed. 222 On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that the Eleventh Amendment gives States and their employees absolute immunity from suits by its citizens seeking damages. 223 The
court further held that the claims for injunctive or declaratory dam216. See Watson v. Utah, No. 95-4191, 1996 WL 705219, at *7-8 (10th Cir. Dec. 9,
1996) (discussing the issues of deference and statutory interpretation that
must be considered when focusing on the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA);
Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV94-5796RJD 1996 WL
684426, (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996); Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649-50
(E.D. Mich. 1998), afi'd, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing the existing
limited scope of the provisions of the ADA, underlining the idea that it is not
a blanket statute under which to bring suit).
217. No. 95-4191, 1996 WL 705219 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 1996).
218. See id. at *1.
219. See id.
220. See id. The plaintiff admitted to being a substantiated child sex abuser. See id.
at *2.
221. See id. at *3.
222. See id. at *1.
223. See id. (citing Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1525 (10th Cir. 1988». The
court also held that the state prosecutors were entitled to qualified immunity
for investigative functions and absolute immunity for activities "intimately associated with the judicial process." Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409,430 (1976) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993»).
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ages were moot as by statute the only person who can bring a petition to terminate a parent's rights in Utah is the Attorney General,
and the plaintiff did not name the Attorney General in her suit.224
Additionally, the court wrote that the plaintiff had not been denied
access to any service or program offered by the State, and thus
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 225
Again in Bartell v. Lohiser,226 a federal court held that the defendants had qualified immunity from the particular claim, and
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 227 There,
the plaintiff's parental rights had been terminated.228~Instead of appealing, the plaintiff chose to bring a separate action alleging a violation of the ADA in terminating her parental rights. 229 The plaintiff
tried to commit suicide and had been hospitalized for depression. 230
Shortly thereafter, the Family Independent Agency (FIA) received
complaints that the plaintiff abused her child.231 FIA then placed
parental aids into the home to help the mother, but the attempts
were unsuccessful, and the mother voluntarily placed her child in
foster care.232 When the mother sought to bring the child home,
the FIA petitioned the court for custody of the child.233 The court
granted the petition, and the child remained in the foster home.234
FIA then contracted with Lutheran Social Services (LSS)235 to provide services to the mother to help reunite her with her child. 236
The mother was given a number of services, but still was unable to
care for her child. Consequently, LSS recommended to FIA that termination proceedings be initiated.2~7 The court found by clear and
convincing evidence that the mother was unable to care for her
child due to her mental and emotional conditions and the child's
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See id.
See id. at *3.
12 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
See id. at 650.
See id. at 643.
See id. at 644.
See id. at 642.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 643.
See id.
Lutheran Social Services (LSS) is a private company that the State contracts
with to provide services to families in need. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
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developmental problems. 238 The mother brought a separate action
suing the state agency, the individual employees of the State involved in her case, and LSS and its employees. 239
The State argued that it and its employees were immune from
suit, as well as LSS and its employees who were acting for the
State. 240 The mother argued that her parental rights had been terminated because of her mental disabilities, and that determination
violated the ADA.241 The court mentioned the numerous services offered to the mother and stressed the fact that the mother did not
offer any evidence that the State had offered services to nondisabled persons and excluded her because of her disability.242 The
court also stated that nothing in the ADA required a State to ignore
a parent's disability when determining the parent's ability to raise a
child, nor does the ADA require the provision of special services to
the disabled. 243 The court held that the government defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity and that the private employees
were also immune as they were acting as an "arm of the state."244
Therefore, the court granted the defendant's motions for summary
judgment. 245
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 246 The court held that
the ADA does not negate qualified immunity for States and their
agencies. 247 The court found that LSS was acting as an arm of the
State, and therefore, qualified immunity applied "with particular
force to the foster care services provided by the LSS. "248 The court
applied a two-step test to determine whether the State and its employees, including LSS, could properly assert qualified immunity in
this case. 249 The first step is whether a "clearly established" statutory
or constitutional right has been violated.250 The second step is to determine whether the state official acted unreasonably in light of the
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id. at 650.
See id. at 644.
See id. at 645.
See id. at 649.
See id.
See id. at 650.
See id. at 645-46.
See id. at 650.
See Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 560 (6th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
See id. at 557.
Id.
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"clearly established" right. 251 The court held that the State did not
violate the plaintiff's constitutional right to raise her child because
the State's interest in the well-being of her child superceded the
mother's interest. 252 Therefore, the court found that qualified immunity was properly granted in this case.253
The third case, Morrison v. Commissioner of SPecial Services,254 also
was dismissed. There, the plaintiff filed an action alleging violations
of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.255 The plaintiff contended that
she was being discriminated against as she was refused custody and
visitation of her children because she was an Mrican American, and
because she had a mental illness. 256 The plaintiff further claimed
that she did not receive notice from the defendant of an intent to
terminate her parental rights or notice that the defendant moved to
stay an order returning visitation rights to the plaintiff. 257 The plaintiff alleged that non-Mrican Americans were given this notice.
The court pointed out that while the Supreme Court recognized a parent's liberty interest in raising her children, that interest
is not absolute. 258 The court stated that the government has a compelling state interest in protecting children from abuse and neglect,
and parents do not have a constitutional right to rely on DSS to
strengthen and reunite the parent with her children. 259 The court
found the plaintiff's claim that she did not receive notice was without merit. 260 The plaintiff did receive a copy of the motion to stay
the order for visitation, which included the date and place where
the family court would hear the issue, and no evidence was
presented that non-Mrican American persons received more notice
than the plaintiff. 261
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

256.
257.
258.
259.

260.
261.

Id.
See id. at 558.
See id.
No. CV94-5796RJD, 1996 WL 684426 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996).
See id. at *2.
See id.
See id.
See id. at *3.
See id. (quoting Marisol v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp 662, 677 (S.D.N.Y 1996». The
court quoted from the Southern District Court of New York who stated that,
"the only courts to apply the concept of family integrity to the child welfare
context have done so when children in foster care were denied visitation with
siblings and parents." Mariso~ 929 F. Supp. at 676.
See Morrison, 1996 WL 684426, at *2.
See id. at *3.
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In Morrison, the court created a four-part test to determine if
the ADA had been violated. 262 Under the test a plaintiff must show:
262. See id. The court derived this four-part test from the tests stated in Flight v.
Gloeckler, and Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health and Hospitals Corp. See Flight v.
Glocker, 68 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1995); Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health and Hosps.
Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
In Flight, the plaintiff was disabled and confined to a wheel chair because
he suffered from multiple sclerosis. See Flight, 68 F.3d at 63. He was a client of
New York State's Office of Vocational and Educations Services for Individuals
with Disabilities (VESID) for a number of years. See id. The VESID established
an employment plan for him as a homemaker. See id. Although the plaintiff
wished to purchase a van to accommodate his disability and requested financial assistance from VESID, its policy only provided for financial assistance to
modify vehicles if the modifications were necessary in the pursuit of employment. See id. The policies allowed for 10,500 dollars if the disabled person
would be the driver of the modified vehicle and 4,000 dollars if the disabled
person was to be the passenger of the vehicle. [d. Plaintiff was not satisfied
with the grant. See id. They determined that the plaintiff was too disabled to
drive the modified vehicle and did not require the modified vehicle to work.
See id. However, VESID offered to pay 4,000 dollars to help him modify the
van despite their policies. See id. Thus plaintiff sued alleging violation of the
Rehabilitation Act. See id. The court followed a four part test to determine if
the Rehabilitation Act had been violated. The court stated that to prove a violation of the Rehabilitation Act section 504, a plaintiff would have to show:
(1) that he has a disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, (2)
that he is "otherwise qualified" for the benefit that has been denied,
(3) that he has been "denied the benefits" solely by reason of his disability, and (4) that the benefit is part of a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
[d. (citing Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981)). The
court determined it had not. See id. at 64.
In Lincoln, the plaintiffs were disabled children who had been receiving
services from a clinic that was shut down because of cuts in the budget. See
Lincoln, 920 F. Supp. at 491. The plaintiffs were not satisfied with the solution
of being transferred to another clinic and filed suit alleging violations of the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 492. The court used a three part test to
determine if there had been a violation of the ADA. See id. at 497. To establish
a violation of Title II of the ADA, plaintiff must show that: "(1) he or she is a
'qualified individual with a disability,' (2) he or she is being excluded from
participation in or being denied the benefits of some service, program or activity by reason of his or her disability, and (3) the entity which provides the
service, program or activity is a public entity." [d. (citing Civic Assoc. of the Deaf,
915 F. Supp. 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y 1996)). The court used a similar four part test
to determine if there had been a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at
496. To prevail on a Rehabilitation Act claim a plaintiff must show: "(1) they
are 'handicapped persons' under the Act; (2) they are 'otherwise qualified'
for the benefit that has been denied; (3) they are being denied benefits solely
by reason of their disabilities; and (4) the entity denying plaintiffs benefits re-
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(1) that she has a disability, (2) that she is "otherwise
qualified" for the benefit that has been denied, (3) that
she was either excluded from participation in or denied
benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the
public entity, and (4) that such discrimination was by
reason of plaintiff's disability.263
The court ruled that the plaintiff could not prevail because she
failed to satisfy the element requiring proof that she is otherwise qualified for the benefit that she was denied. 264 The court
held that the plaintiff was not qualified to act as a parent to her
children. 265
Therefore, under the Morrison four-part test for determining an ADA violation of parents, most plaintiffs will have difficulty prevailing in any actions. Obviously, if a parent's parental
rights were terminated, a court has found her not qualified to
raise and care for their children. 266 Thus, under Morrison, a
court will never find such parents otherwise qualified individuals as required in the four-part ADA test. 267

B.

State Courts and the Supremacy Clause

The Supremacy Clause deems state law contrary to federal law
to be without effect. 268 To determine whether a federal statute
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause, the legislative intent must be discerned. 269 The purpose of the ADA is to "prevent
old-fashioned and unfounded prejudices against disabled persons
from interfering with those individuals' rights to enjoy the same

263.
264.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

ceives federal financial assistance." Id. (citing Flight v. Gloeckler, 68 F.3d 61,
63 (2d Cir. 1995». The court found that the plaintiff's had failed to show a
public service or program that had been offered to the non-disabled but denied to the disabled. See id. at 496-97. The court wrote that the "disabled are
not entitled to more public services than the abled receive, even if the disabled need them." Id. at 497 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 30102 (1995».
Morrison, 1996 WL 684426, at *3.
See id. at *4.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2.
See Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children and Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824,
830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citing California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987».
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privileges and duties afforded to all United States citizens."27o The
ADA was not meant, in and of itself, to re-write state substantive
law.271 State courts have said that it was not the intent of Congress
to change the substantive obligations imposed by unrelated state
statutes. 272 Therefore, the ADA has no impact on the operation of
each state's termination of parental rights statute. 273 The courts state
that whether an ADA violation occurred is a separate action other
than whether the court properly determined to terminate parental
rights. 274 This is why state courts have held that it is inappropriate
for parents to use alleged violations of the ADA as a defense or to
appeal a termination proceeding. 275
Other state courts have argued that even if the ADA does apply
to the State's substantive law they have followed the ADA in their
termination proceedings, and no violations have octurred.276 The
first case reported on this issue was Stone v. Daviess County Division of
Children and Family Services.277 There, both parents had extremely low
IQ's278 and had five children who were deemed CINAs due to alleged sex abuse, malnutrition, dangerous living conditions, lack of
270. Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV94-5796RJD, 1996 WL
684426, at *3 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996) (quoting Galloway v. Superior Ct. of
D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 20 (D.D.C. 1993»; see also Marisol v. Giuliani, 929 F.
Supp. 662, 685 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to
"provide reasonable accommodations for the handicapped").
271. See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 830.
272. See In 71! Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); see also In 71!
B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317-18 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "other courts
have refused to graft ADA requirements onto unrelated statutes"); In 71! B.S.,
693 A.2d 716, 721-22 (Vt. 1997) (holding that ADA requirements are inapplicable to termination of parental rights proceedings).
273. See Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245; see also B.K.F., 704 So. 2d at 317; B.S., 693
A.2d at 721.
274. See Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245; see also B.K.F., 704 So. 2d at 317; B.S., 693
A.2d at 721.
275. See Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245; see also B.K.F., 704 So. 2d at 317; In re B.S.,
693 A.2d at 721.
276. See In 71! C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the
State made reasonable accommodations and termination was proper); In 71!
Angel B., 659 A.2d 277, 279 (Me. 1995) (holding that a number of services
had been offered and tailored to the mother's cognitive defects, therefore no
ADA violation occurred); In 71! Welfare AJ.R., 896 P.2d 1298 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995) (holding services had been offered to parents who were mentally deficient and abused drugs and alcohol and termination was proper).
277. 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
278. See id. at 827.
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superVISIon, and truancy.279 While the parents began classes and
counseling, the children were removed from the parents' home and
placed in the custody of the State.280 Neither parent improved nor
admitted that they were not properly caring for their children. 281
These services extended over four years, and the parents were still
not able to properly care for their children. 282 Consequently, termination proceedings were initiated, and the court terminated their
parental rights. 283 The parents appealed the termination, alleging an
ADA violation.284 The parents claimed that social services had a duty
to offer services that accommodated their mental problems. 285 The
court found that Congress did not intend the ADA to impact unrelated state substantive law; therefore, the ADA had no impact on
termination statutes. 286 Indiana's termination statute did not require
any services to be provided to any parent before parental rights
were terminated. 287 If social services violated the parents' ADA rights
in providing the services, the parents' only remedy was to bring a
separate proceeding. 288
C.

State Court Decisions

Wisconsin decided the first case addressing whether a parent
could use an alleged violation of the ADA as a defense to the termination of parental rights. 289 That court held that the inquiry into
See id. at 826.
See id. at 826-27.
See id. at 827.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 829.
See id.
See id. at 829-30 (citing In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994) ).
287. See "id. at 830. Therefore, in this case, the Division of Children and Family Services exceeded what was required by the statute. See id. at 831. However, the
court explained that once an agency provides some services, "the provision of
those services must be in compliance with the ADA." Id. at 830. Nonetheless,
the services provided to the Stone's were tailored to their specific needs. See
id. at 831.
288. See id. at 829 (" [A]ny alleged non-compliance with the ADA ... in the provision of services . . . would be a matter separate and distinct from the operation of our termination statute.").
289. See In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245-46; see also Wright v. Alexandria Div. of
Social Servs., 433 S.E.2d 500 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). Wright was the first case seeking to appeal a termination of parental rights judgment based on a violation
of the ADA, but the court passed on the issue because it was procedurally

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
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whether the father's rights under the ADA had been violated was
separate and distinct from the issue of whether the trial court erred
in terminating the father's parental rights. 290 Wisconsin's termination statute required that diligent efforts be made to offer courtordered services to parents to try to reunite the parent and child
before the parental rights can be terminated. 291
In In re Torrance P.,292 the Wisconsin court held that whether
the State made a diligent effort to offer the court-ordered services
must be considered by the "totality of the circumstances" of each
case. 293 There, the court found that the effort must be examined in
light of the father's limitations, including his illiteracy.294 The Torrence court emphasized that the duty to provide the court-ordered
services was proscribed by the State termination statute, not the
ADA.295
The Torrance court further stated that the ADA does not increase that duty nor does it proscribe how to perform that duty.296
The purpose of an appeal is to determine whether the State has
met its burden, under the state statute, in showing that it made a
diligent effort to offer the court-ordered services in light of the father's limitations. 297 Neither the father's disability, nor the ADA
changes that test or the State's burden of proof. 29B
The Torrance court determined that the ADA did not apply to
the case, so it did not determine whether the State reasonably accommodated the father's disability.299 The court instead held that
the father's allegation of a violation of the ADA would have to be
brought under a separate cause of action. 3OO
A Louisiana appellate court in In re B.KF.301 affirmed the district court's decision that a mother with schizophrenia could not

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

barred since it had not been raised at the trial court level. See Wright, 433
S.E.2d at 505.
See Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 245-46; see also supra notes 12-14, 18-21 and accompanying text.
See WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2) (b) (1997 & Supp. 2000.·2001).
522 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
See id. at 245.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 245-46.
See id. at 246.
See id.
704 So. 2d 314 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
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raise a violation of the ADA as a defense to her tennination of parental rights. 302 The court determined that the ADA did not apply
to tennination of parental rights proceedings because such proceedings are not services, programs, or activities covered by the ADA.303
The court noted that the mother should have filed a separate law
suit to challenge an alleged ADA violation, and it refused to "graft
ADA requirements onto unrelated statutes. "304
The Vennont Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in
In re B.S.305 In that case, a mother who was mentally retarded appealed the tennination of her parental rights alleging a violation of
the ADA.306 The mother argued that if she were to receive assistance
from the Lund Family Center she would be able to care for her
child, and therefore be otherwise qualified. 307 The court held that
the ADA does not apply to termination proceedings because those
proceedings are not programs, services, or activities as described by
Title II of the ADA.308 The court noted that the family court is concerned only with issues dealing with the child and cannot consider
other issues such as alleged ADA violations. 309 The court stressed
that the ADA provides for a separate cause of action for violations
of that statute; therefore, parents who allege a violation of the ADA
should bring a separate law suit. 31O
A Washington appellate court upheld the State's tennination of
a parental rights statute which provides that a State can take into
account mental deficiencies when deciding to terminate parental
rights. 311 The court held that a statute is unconstitutionally applied
when it has been applied arbitrarily.312 The court found that the evi302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

309.
310.
311.

312.

See id. at 317.
See id.
Id. at 317-18.
693 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1997).
See id. at 717.
See id. at 717-20.
See id. at 720; see also In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)
(holding that a termination proceeding is not a service, program, or activity
under the ADA and that the ADA does not provide a defense to or require
special obligations in termination of parental right proceedings).
See In re B.S., 693 A.2d at 721.
See id.
See Welfare of H.S. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 973 P.2d 474, 484
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) ("While the State is barred from arbitrarily removing
children merely because the parents are mentally ill, the mentally ill are not
immune from having their children removed if they are unfit. ").
See id. at 483.
.
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dence presented in this case showed that the decision was not arbitrary.3I3 The record reflected the nature of the parents' illnesses and
the effect the illnesses had on their ability to parent. 314 That court
also held that the ADA does not require public entities to provide
services to the disabled that are not provided to other individuals.315
To date, most state courts addressing this issue have held that
ADA violations are not a defense to termination of parental
rights. 316 Other state courts have rejected the alleged violation of
the ADA claims of the parents because the States provided services
to the parents. 317 However, those courts do not discuss if the services provided met the statutory requirements, the ADA requirements, or both. 318 Two state courts have held that if the ADA did
apply, the services offered were enough and the ADA was not violated. 319 Regardless of how the state courts reached their decisions,
they all hold that the ADA did not provide a valid defense to termi-

313. See id. The court stated, "[ t] he findings recite in detail the affirmative evidence on which the court relied in establishing current unfitness." Id.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 48l.
316. See, e.g., J.T. v. Arkansas, 947 S.W.2d 761, 768 (Ark. 1997) (stating that the
"parent's rights under the ADA must be subordinate to the p"rotected rights
of the child"); Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656
N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); In re B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that the "ADA may not be used as a defense in a parental
rights termination case"); In re John D., 934 P.2d 308, 314 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that when "the evidence [is] sufficient for the ... court to find that
[the parent] was responsible for the destruction of the parent-child relationship despite reasonable efforts by the Department, ... the ADA could not be
used under the facts of this case to shift that responsibility").
317. See In re C.M., 526, 566 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
reasonable accommodations were made); In re Welfare of L.L., No. 20483-5-11,
1997 WL 677961, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the mother did
not meet her burden of showing that the statute was unconstitutional and
that the state statute violated the ADA); In re Joshua R., No. 15381-9-III, 1998
WL 465203, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that "services previously provided to them were sufficiently tailored to address their disabilities . . . ").
318. See, e.g., In re Joshua R., No. 15381-9-III; In re Welfare of L.L., No. 20483-5-11,
Angel B., 659 A.2d 277 (Me. 1995); Robinson v. Washington, 896 P.2d 1298
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
319. See In re Angel B., 659 A.2d at 279 (stating that the State "offered a number of
services that took [the parent's] pace and cognitive skills into account");
Rnbinson, 896 P.2d at, 1302-03 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the stateprovided services were modified to accommodate the parents specific disabilities) .
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nation of parental rights. 320
VI. MARYLAND LAW

A.

Issue of First Impression

1.

Maryland Courts Look to Other Jurisdictions for Guidance

In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633,321 the court was faced
with a family law issue of first impression. In that case, foster parents wanted an opportunity to be heard when the foster children
they were caring for were removed from their home and adopted
by another couple. They alleged that their due process rights had
been violated because they had a statutory preference to adopt the
child, and they were not given a hearing or opportunity to adopt. 322
They contended that they had a protected liberty interest as foster
parents and should be heard. 323
Maryland's highest court has held that where there is an issue
of first impression, the court must examine authority from other jurisdictions for guidance in deciding the issue under Maryland law,324
therefore the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland looked at the
precedent of other courts who had decided that issue. Those courts
320. See, e.g., Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d
824 .(Ind. Ct. App. 1995); In 1li B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314 (La. Ct. App. 1997); In 1li
John D., 934 P.2d 308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); J.T. v. Arkansas, 947 S.W.2d 761
(Ark. 1997).
321. 101 Md. App. 274, 646 A.2d 1036 (1994).
322. See id. at 293, 646 A.2d at 1045.
323. See id.
324. See Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 241, 539 A.2d 637, 644 (1988). In Harris the
court was confronted with an issue of first impression as to whether successive
sentencing of a defendent was cruel and unusual punishment. See id. The
court noted that a majority of other jurisdictions that had addressed this issue
had held that a successive sentencing of a defendant did not amount to cruel
and unusual punishment. See id. at 241, 539 A.2d at 644. Thus, the court of
appeals, after examining these cases from other jurisdictions, held that successive sentencing did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at
241-42, 539 A.2d at 644-45. Again, in Albert S., the court of special appeals was
confronted with an issue of first impression. See In 1li Albert S., 106 Md. App.
376, 664 A.2d 476 (1995). The court looked to other jurisdictions and noted
that other state courts had consistently held that where an off-duty police officer "steps outside the sphere of legitimate private action" the Fourth
Amendment applies to his conduct. Id. at 386, 664 A.2d at 481. After reviewing the state courts' decisions, the court came to the same conclusion as the
other state courts and held the Fourth Amendment applied to the off duty officer's conduct. See id. at 38&-92, 644 A.2d at 481-84.
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held that foster parents do not have a protected liberty interest and
that foster care allows the state to have ultimate control over the
children while they are being cared for on a day-to-day basis by a
foster family. As such, the State creates any relationship that exists
between the foster family and the foster child and that relationship
is deemed to be temporary; therefore, no state-created rights or liberty interest exists in the foster parents. 325
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland concluded that after
reviewing the other courts' precedents on the issue it was "obliged
to conclude" that foster families do not have a protected liberty interest. 326 From the interpretation of these cases, Maryland courts
when faced with an issue of first impression follow the precedent established by other courts where those courts have consistent
holdings.
2. Other Jurisdictions and the Use of the ADA as a Defense in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings
As the use of the ADA as a defense in a parental rights termination proceeding is an issue of first impression in Maryland, other
jurisdictions must be examined. 327 Two federal courts have addressed this issue and held that states are entitled to qualified immunity in ADA actions; therefore, the ADA is not a defense in termination of parental right proceedings. 328 The federal court in
Bartell stated that there is nothing in the ADA that requires a state
to ignore a parent's disability when determining their ability to raise
325. See In re Albert S., 106 Md. App. at 294-95, 646 A.2d at 1046 (citing Kyees v.

County Dep't. of Public Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
that foster families have more limited liberty than natural or adopted families»; Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family and Children's Servs., 563
F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978) (holding that
the foster relationship is temporary); DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 28
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (observing that " [fJoster parents do not have a cognizable liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with a foster child"); Sherrard v.
Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728, 742 (W.D. Mich. 1980), affd, 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.
1981), em. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981) ("[AJny expectation of 'family' continuity or permanency based upon the provisional foster family license . . .
was totally unreasonable.").
326. In re Albert S., 101 Md. App. at 292, 646 A.2d at 1095. The court also stated
that after reviewing the other court decision on this relevant issue they followed what the other courts decided but were "reluctant" in that decision. [d.
327. See supra Part VI.A.l.
328. See Watson v. Utah, No. 954191, 1996 WL 705219 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 1996) Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d. 640 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
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their child, nor does the ADA require special services to be provided to the disabled. 329
The federal court in Morrison determined that the ADA does
not apply where a court terminates a parents rights because the parent is not an otherwise qualified individual. 330 The court concluded
that the plaintiff was not qualified to act as a mother to her child. 331
Other state jurisdictions have held that a violation of the ADA
is not a defense to a termination of parental rights proceeding, because an inquiry into an ADA violation is separate and distinct from
whether the court erred in terminating a person's parental rights. 332
Other state courts have held that a violation of the ADA is not a defense to a termination of parental rights proceeding as such proceedings are not services, programs, or activities covered by the
ADA.333
The fact that a number of state and federal courts have consistently held that the ADA is not a defense to termination of parental
rights is significant in determining whether Maryland should follow
suit. Since the state and federal courts may differ on the reason why
the ADA is not a defense in a termination proceeding, it is helpful
to look at Maryland's position on termination, and how it has applied the ADA in other settings.

B.
III

Maryland s Current Position on Termination of Parental Rights
Maryland recognizes the substantial interest that a parent has
raising her child, which is protected by the Constitution, com-

329. See Bartel~ 12 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
330. See Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Servs., No. CV94-5796RJD, 1996 WL
684426, at *4 (E.D.N.Y Nov. 18, 1996).
331. See id.
332. See, e.g., J.T. v. Arkansas, 947 S.W.2d 761, 766-fJ7 (Ark. 1997) (finding that a
mother did not establish the Department of Health Services violated the ADA
since denial of visitation was based on the best interest of the child rather
than on the disability of the parent); Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children
and Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding the State
did not violate the ADA in terminating parental rights of parents of limited
intelligence); In 1l? John D., 934 P.2d 308, 314 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that the plaintiff has the burden of establishing she is a "qualified individual
with a disability" to establish an ADA violation); In 1l? Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d
243, 246 (Wise. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that Congress did not enact the ADA
to change obligations imposed by unrelated statutes).
333. See In 1l? B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding the ADA provided no defense to termination of a schizophrenic mother's parental rights);
In 1l? B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 720 (Vt. 1997) (finding no specific discrimination
against disabled persons in the termination process).
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mon law and statute. Because of the substantial interest involved,
Maryland has developed a detailed statutory scheme to be used in
termination of parental rights proceedings. 334 In addition to satisfYing these statutes, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights. This heightened standard of proof is required by due
process protections guaranteed to the biological parent. 335
Although the rights of a parent to raise their child is substantial, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has been clear in stating that
in adoption and custody cases the controlling factor is not the
rights of the natural parents, but instead what is in the best interest
of the child. 336 The court has stated "in all cases where the interest
of a child are in jeopardy the paramount consideration is what will
best promote the child's welfare, a consideration that is of 'transcendent importance.' "337
In order to determine what is in the best interest of the child
in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court must consider subsections c and d of section 5-313 of the Family Law Article. 338 One factor in section 5-313(d) provides that in determining
what the best interest of the child, the court must consider whether
the parent has a disability of alcoholism, drug abuse, mental illness,
or mental retardation 339 which prevents the parent from properly
caring for her child. 340 If the court finds this to be the case it can
relieve social services of the obligation to provide services to reunifY
the parent and child. 341 While section 5-313(d) may seem to discriminate against individuals with the enumerated disabilities, the courts
have made clear that the disability alone is not enough to terminate
parental rights. 342 As a further safeguard against discrimination, the
disability has to make the parent unable to care for the child now
334. See Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw, §§ 513(c)(d) (2000).
335. See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 828.
336. In 111 Adoption Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 559, 640 A.2d 1085,
1095 (1994).
337. See In 111 Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 114, 642 A.2d 201,
209 (1993).
338. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
340. See MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (d) (1)(i).
341. See Mo CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(d) (3); see also In 111 Adoption/Guardianship No. J970013, 128 Md. App. 242, 253, 737 A.2d 612, 610 (1999) (finding
the termination of parental rights of a father serving 20 years to life in prison
was something that might never occur).
342. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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and in the future. 343 Ensuring a child's safety and stable living arrangements must come before the interests of the parents.
The court of appeals has further held in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 1094]344 that where the mother has severe mental disorders, is unfit to care for her child, and may remain unfit to care for
her child indefinitely, attempts at reunification services would be futile and DSS does not have to offer assistance. 345 In that case, the
mother suffered from schizophrenia for many years. 346 She moved
from month to month sometimes living in homeless shelters, was
unemployed, and refused to get help for her mental disorder. 347
The court found that she was unfit to care for her child and that
her situation was not a "temporary crisis" nor the result of a "string
of bad luck. "348 The court stated that DSS did provide a reasonable
amount of assistance to reunify the parent with her child but even
if they had not the termination would have been proper. 349 Although the ADA was not considered in this case, the holding, along
with the statutory counterpart, seems to agree with courts that have
found the ADA does not apply because termination proceedings are
separate and distinct from alleged violations of the ADA.350
C.

Maryland Law on ADA Violations in Court Proceedings

The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that a violation of
the ADA cannot be used as a defense in a court proceeding. 351 In
Green v. North Arundel Hospital Association,352 a minor brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital and some physicians for
failing to identify the shunt in his brain as malfunctioning, resulting
343. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 119, 642 A.2d 201,
210-11 (1993).
344. 335 Md. 99, 642 A.2d 201 (1993).
345. See id. at 117-18, 642 A.2d at 210-11.
346. See id. at 118, 642 A.2d at 210-11.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 118-19, 642 A.2d at 211.
349. See id. at 117, 642 A.2d at 210.
350. See, e.g., J.T. v. Arkansas, 947 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1997); Stone v. Daviess County
Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); In re
John D., 934 P.2d 308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243
(Wise. Ct. App. 1994).
351. See Green v. North Arundel Hosp. Ass'n., 126 Md. App. 394, 417-18, 730 A.2d
221, 234 (1998) (finding a disabled child who was in a vegetative state did not
have the absolute right to attend his medical malpractice trial as an observer).
352. 126 Md. App. 394, 730 A.2d 221 (1998).
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in a vegetative state. 353 The trial judge bifurcated the trial on the issues of liability and damages. 354 The defendants in the case made a
motion in limine to exclude the plaintiff from the courtroom during the liability portion of the triaP55 The trial judge granted the
motion on the basis that the plaintiff was not able to assist counsel,
testify on his own behalf or even understand what was occurring in
the proceedings. 356 At the conclusion of the case, the plaintiff appealed inter alia that his exclusion from the trial was a violation of
the ADA.3S7 The court of appeals held that a party does not have an
absolute right to attend trial. 358 The court held that
[F]ederal regulations implementing the requirements of the
ADA state: A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program or activity.359
The court found that the ADA did not apply in that case. 360 The
court stated that the ADA provides only for injunctive relief and
does not allow a judgment between two private parties to be
reversed. 361
Assuming the ADA applied and had been violated in this case,
the court held that the plaintiff's only recourse would be to bring a
separate action against the judge in his official capacity since the
ADA only allows for an action against the public entity for prospective relief.362
Having taken this approach to the ADA, it seems that the court
of appeals would agree with other courts who decided that a viola353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See id. at 398, 730 A.2d at 223.
See id. at 400, 730 A.2d at 224.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 401, 730 A.2d at 224-25.
See id. at 417, 730 A.2d at 234.
Id. at 415-16,730 A.2d at 233 (quoting 28 C.ER. § 35.130(b)(7) (1999»; see also
Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 979 (9th
Cir. 1997), cere. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997) (finding that a public transit system's policy requiring disabled participants to re-certify that they are disabled
did not discriminate against participants on the basis of their disability).
360. See Green, 126 Md. App. at 417, 730 A.2d at 233.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 416-17, 730 A.2d at 233.

390

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

tion of the ADA is not a defense to a termination of parental rights
proceeding because they are separate and distinct proceedings. Further, the court in Green stated that if the ADA applied and had
been violated the plaintiff's only recourse would be to bring a separate action. 363 This is consistent with other state courts' holdings
that a parent's only recourse would be to bring a separate action alleging a violation of the ADA.364

VII. CONCLUSION
The Americans with Disabilities Act is intended to protect people with disabilities from discrimination. 365 It is not intended to preempt state law regarding termination of parental rights. 366 Therefore, alleging a violation of the ADA is not a valid defense against
termination of parental rights. 367 However, a violation of the ADA
gives to a parent a separate cause of action. 368
While Maryland has not yet decided this issue, it seems likely
that a Maryland court would follow the lead of a number of other
state and federal courts, allowing a separate claim for alleged violations of the ADA. However, such actions would not allow parents to
defend termination of parental rights by claiming violations of the
ADA.
jennifer Wright Burke
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367.
368.
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See
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